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THE "APPEARANCE OF FAIRNESS" VERSUS "ACTUAL
UNFAIRNESS": WHICH STANDARD SHOULD THE




Administrative agencies, with their inherent combination of leg-
islative, executive, and judicial functions, are in direct conflict with
the separation of powers doctrine. This fact is well-recognized, I
generally accepted, 2 and, in itself, is not necessarily disturbing.3 What
* Assistant Attorney General for the State of Arkansas. The views set forth
in this article are those of the author and are not expressed on behalf of the
Office of the Attorney General.
1. The combination of functions in administrative agencies has been the subject
of numerous publications. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and
Positive Political Theory: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO.
L.J. 671 (1992); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Combination of Functions in Admin-
istrative Actions: An Examination of European Alternatives, 40 FoRDHAM L. REv.
101 (1971); L. Scott Stafford, Separation of Powers and Arkansas Administrative
Agencies: Distinguishing Between Judicial Power and Legislative Power, 7 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 279 (1984); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government:
Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. Rv. 573 (1984).
2. The accepted status of the combination of functions in administrative agencies
is illustrated by the following statement by Professor Stafford: "In one of the few
cases in which the issue of combining executive and legislative powers in a single
agency was even raised, the [Arkansas Supreme Court] seemed to view the phe-
nomenon as an accomplished fact that could not be reversed." Stafford, supra
note 1, at 280 n.6 (citing Hickenbottom v. McCain, 207 Ark. 485, 181 S.W.2d
226 (1944)). The primary reasons for such acceptance are expedience and practicality;
administrative agencies are viewed as being necessary to the operation of government.
See infra note 3 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, in 1951, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Jackson lamented the pro-
liferation of administrative agencies and the impact that they had been allowed to
make on the separation of powers doctrine, for expediency's sake. See Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1951)(Jackson, J., dissenting).
The same year, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1951),
Justice Frankfurter admonished:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention
of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the
inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 613 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293
(1926)). The Arkansas Supreme Court has expressed the same view. See infra note
38 and accompanying text.
. 3. It has been suggested that the realities of modern government have decreased
the practicality of a strict application of the separation of powers doctrine. See,
e.g., Stafford, supra note 1, at 280.
UALR LAW JOURNAL
is a matter of concern, however, is the loss in administrative agencies
of the protection against unfairness that is provided by the separation
of powers doctrine.
Concerns about this loss of protection have been voiced since
the inception of the first administrative agencies. 4 As a means of
replacing the lost protection against unfairness in administrative
agencies, both the Federal Administrative Procedure Act5 and the
Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act6 were crafted to contain
provisions7 to re-create a semblance of the separation of powers" by
requiring an internal separation of functions, prohibiting ex parte
communications, and requiring the publication of any ex parte com-
munications that take place.
However, certain administrative agencies in Arkansas are not
subject to the provisions of the Arkansas Administrative Procedure
Act and its safeguards.9 The Act expressly excepts from its governance
the Public Service Commission, the State Highway Commission, the
State Highway and Transportation Department, 0 the Commission
on Pollution Control and Ecology, the Contractors Licensing Board,
the State Department of Health, the Arkansas Workers' Compen-
sation Commission, the Arkansas Employment Security Department,
and the Department of Veterans' Affairs."
The statute states that these agencies were excepted from the
Act because the General Assembly had determined "that the existing
laws governing those agencies provide adequate administrative pro-
cedures for those agencies."'' 2 Although these agencies do have their
4. The first administrative agency in the United States federal government was
the Interstate Commerce Commission, established in 1887. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10521-
11917 (1988). For examples of the specific concerns that have been voiced, see
infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988).
6. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-15-201 to -214 (Michie 1992).
7. See infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
8. This article assumes, for the sake of argument, that these provisions are
actually effective in replacing the lost protections of the separation of powers
doctrine and does not address the question of whether or not they are, in fact,
effective.
9. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-202(l)(B)(Michie 1992).
10. The language of the statute refers to the State Transportation Commission.
That commission was abolished and replaced by the Transportation Regulatory
Board and the Transportation Safety Agency by 1987 Ark. Acts 572. Subsequently,
1989 Ark. Acts 67, § 23 and 1989 Ark. Acts 153, §§ 2-3 abolished the board and
the agency and transferred their powers, functions, and duties to the State Highway
Commission and the State Highway and Transportation Department, respectively.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-2-202 (Michie Supp. 1993).




own procedural laws and rules, as stated by the Administrative
Procedure Act, 3 the laws and rules of some of these agencies do
not provide the same safeguards as are provided by the Administrative
Procedure Act. Of particular concern are the laws and rules governing
the Public Service Commission, the State Highway Commission, the
State Highway and Transportation Department, the Department of
Health, and the Workers' Compensation Commission. The comments
contained in this article will focus collectively on the lack of pro-
tection against unfairness in those agencies.' 4 Throughout the course
of this article, they will be referred to as "the Arkansas excepted
agencies."
The laws and rules of none of the Arkansas excepted agencies 5
require an internal separation of functions, 6 none prohibit ex parte
communications between agency advocates and agency decision-mak-
ers, and none require the publication of such internal ex parte
communications. 7 Yet the Arkansas excepted agencies not only per-
13. Id.
14. This article will not address the Contractors Licensing Board, because the
laws governing procedures before the Contractors Licensing Board state that the
Administrative Procedure Act will apply to such procedures. ARK. CODE ANN. §
17-22-409(d). This article will not address the Department of Veterans Affairs,
because that agency does not perform a regulatory function, nor does it conduct
adjudicative proceedings. This article will not address the Commission on Pollution
Control and Ecology or the Employment Security Department, because those agencies
achieve some measure of separation of powers protection through physical separation
of decision-makers from advocates.
15. Regarding the Public Service Commission, see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-
101 to 23-18-529 (Michie 1987) and the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the
Arkansas Public Service Commission. Regarding the Highway Commission and the
Highway and Transportation Department, see ARK. CODE ANN. Titles 23 and 27
and the General Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Arkansas State Highway
Commission. Regarding the Department of Health, see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-
7-101 to -206 and the Administrative Procedures for the Arkansas State Board of
Health and the Arkansas Department of Health. Regarding the Workers' Com-
pensation Commission, see ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 11-9-101 to -811 and the Arkansas
Workers' Compensation Commission Laws and Rules of the Commission.
16. Some of the agencies have unwritten policies requiring an internal separation
of functions, but these unwritten policies do not have the force of law and are
not enforceable by any party.
17. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Arkansas Public Service Com-
mission and the Administrative Procedures for the Arkansas State Board of Health
and the Arkansas State Department of Health prohibit external ex parte com-
munications, but they expressly allow internal ex parte communications. See Rule
1.06 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Arkansas Public Service
Commission and Section V of the Administrative Procedures for the Arkansas State
Board of Health and the Arkansas State Department of Health. Rule 1.06 of the
Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Arkansas Public Service Commission requires
the publication of external ex parte communications, but not of internal ones. The
19941
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form a typical combination of administrative functions, they also
hold quasi-judicial proceedings in which agency employees may ap-
pear before one another, with one agency employee acting as an
advocate and the other as a judge.
The Arkansas excepted agencies, therefore, lack both the pro-
tection against unfairness that is provided by the separation of powers
doctrine and the protection against unfairness that is provided by
the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act. Accordingly, the po-
tential for unfairness in proceedings held before those agencies is
heightened.
Some courts have supplied the otherwise lacking protection against
unfairness in administrative agencies by applying an "appearance of
fairness" standard in reviewing the proceedings of such agencies.' 8
The application of the "appearance of fairness" standard can lead
to the overturn of an agency's decision upon a showing only that
the combination of functions in the administrative agency appeared
to be unfair.
The purpose of this article is to examine the protection against
unfairness that is lacking in the Arkansas excepted agencies and to
propose that the application of an "appearance of fairness" standard
in challenges to those agencies' proceedings would serve as a means
for providing the lacking protection. A policy of applying such a
standard would instill in these agencies an incentive not only to
avoid the appearance of unfairness, but also to take affirmative
steps to ensure that their proceedings are, in fact, conducted fairly.
II. THE PROTECTION THAT Is LACKING
In order to determine precisely what protection against unfairness
is lacking in the Arkansas excepted agencies, it is necessary to examine
both the separation of powers doctrine and the provisions of the
Arkansas Adminisfrative Procedure Act, which serves as Arkansas's
Administrative Procedures for the Arkansas State Board of Health and the Arkansas
State Department of Health do not require the publication of either type of ex
parte communication. Although the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, ARK.
CODE ANN. § 25-15-209 (Michie 1992), allows for internal ex parte communications,
it requires the publication of both internal and external ex parte communications.
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-208 (Michie Supp. 1993). It also requires a statement
of the basis for all decisions. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-210 (Michie 1992).
These corresponding requirements, which serve to temper the possible ill effects of
the allowance of internal ex parte communications, are not provided for in the
laws and rules governing the Public Service Commission, the Department of Health,
or any of the other excepted Arkansas agencies.
18. See infra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 16:587590
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replacement for separation of powers in administrative agencies. It
is also helpful to review the analogous provisions of the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act, which was enacted as a culminating
response to initial concerns about combined functions in the first
administrative agencies.
A. Separation of Powers
It is axiomatic that the United States government incorporates
a policy of three separate branches of government: legislative,
executive, and judicial. 9 The Arkansas Constitution is even more
explicit in its provision for separation of powers than is the United
States Constitution. 20 In incorporating the doctrine, the framers of
both constitutions had a purpose beyond the simple goal of keeping
the branches of government separate.
1. The Federalist
The Federalist2' provides an enlightening starting point for
obtaining insight into the purpose of the separation of powers doctrine
and how that purpose should be effectuated. An examination of
19. The United States Constitution states:
All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602, 629 (1935)("The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general
departments of government entirely free from the control or coercive influence,
direct or indirect, of either of the others, . . . is hardly open to serious question.").
20. The Arkansas Constitution states:
The powers of the government of the State of Arkansas shall be divided
into three distinct departments, each of them to be confided to a separate
body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative to one, those which
are executive to another, and those which are judicial to another.
ARK. CONST. art. 4, § 1.
No person, or collection of persons, being one of these departments, shall
exercise any power belonging to either of the others, except in the instances
hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.
ArK. CONST. art. 4, § 2.
21. The Federalist was originally published in 1787 as a series of articles in
various New York City newspapers for the purpose of explaining the newly drafted
federal constitution and urging support for its ratification.
19941
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The Federalist indicates that the doctrine was intended to provide
protection against the dangers that can result from the concentration
of power in one person or one group of people. The author22 wrote:
"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary,
in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny. '2 3 "Tyranny" is a theoretically extreme
idea for current times. But its first stage, unfairness, is not. The
separation of powers doctrine's applicability to modern times, then,
might more appropriately be expressed as a protection against
unfairness.
The Federalist further reveals the framers' position that the
protection against such unfairness must be built into the system; it
must be self-executing:
[Tihe great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who
administer each department the necessary constitutional means
and personal motives to resist encroachment of the others. The
provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made
commensurate with the danger of attack. Ambition must be made
to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected
with the constitutional rights of the place .... This policy of
supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better
motives, might be traced through the whole system of human
affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed
in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant
aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner
as that each may be a check on the other - that the private
interest of every individual may be a sentinel over the public
rights. These inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in
the distribution of the supreme powers of the state3'
In order for the built-in incentives to operate properly, according
to The Federalist, there must be at least some overlap of the branches.
22. The articles were signed by "Publius" (a historical reference to Publius
Valerius Publicola, who had led a revolt against the Tarquin kings of ancient Rome
and had subsequently played a leading role in securing the liberties of the people).
The authors were James Madison, John Jay, and Alexander Hamilton. Historians
believe that James Madison wrote the sections addressing separation of powers
(Nos. 47-51). William R. Brock, Introduction to HAMILTON, MADISON, AND JAY,
THE FEDERALIST at ix-xxii (1992).
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison)(Wesleyan Univ. Press ed.,
1961).




"[U]nless these departments be so far connected and blended as to
give to each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of
separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government,
can never in practice be duly maintained. 2 This interdependence
is in essence the foundation of the system of checks and balances.
2 6
It may be concluded, then, from examining The Federalist, that
under the framers' view of the separation of powers doctrine, the
doctrine's goal of keeping the branches of government separate is
not an end in itself, but rather is a means for achieving the goal
of preventing the unfairness that can result from a concentration
of all power in the same hands.2 7 It is a means of preventing any
one person or one group of people from being able to exercise
power arbitrarily or unfairly. If that goal is not achieved by keeping
the branches separate, it must be achieved by some other means.
How do the Arkansas excepted agencies fare using The Federalist's
principles as a basis for analysis? The fact that these agencies blend
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (James Madison)(Wesleyan Univ. Press ed.,
1961).
26. To bolster this requirement of overlap, the author referred to the source
of the separation of powers concept: Montesquieu. The author acknowledged that
Montesquieu may not have invented the separation of powers concept, but pointed
out that he was certainly responsible for bringing it to light. "If he be not the
author of this invaluable precept in the science of politics, he has the merit at
least of displaying and recommending it most effectually to the attention of mankind."
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (James Madison)(Wesleyan Univ. Press ed., 1961).
Montesquieu, the author contended, considered the British Constitution to be
the standard by which other systems of government should be measured; it is
significant, then, that the British system allowed for some overlapping of the
governmental branches. "On the slightest view of the British Constitution, we must
perceive that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are by no means
totally separate and distinct from each other." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325
(James Madison)(Wesleyan Univ. Press ed., 1961).
After giving specific examples from the British system, the author concluded
by stating:
From these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be
inferred that, in saying "There can be no liberty where the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person or body of magistrates,"
... he did not mean that these departments ought to have no partial
agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as
his own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by the
example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that where the
whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles
of a free constitution are subverted.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 325-26 (James Madison)(Wesleyan Univ. Press ed.,
1961).
27. Professor Kenneth Davis, in his Administrative Law Treatise, takes the
position that it is not blended powers that are dangerous, but, rather, unchecked
powers. 1 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTR.ATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.09 (1958).
19941
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the branches of government is not troubling; but, in order to satisfy
The Federalist's standards, there must be some means of and incentive
for the agencies, when acting in the capacity of one particular branch,
to check and balance themselves. Do the laws and rules governing
these agencies provide the administrative decision-makers with a
''personal motive'' 2s for resisting encroachment by advocates? Do
the laws and rules provide them with a defense against such
encroachments? 29 If so, is it a defense that is "commensurate with
the danger of attack? '"30 Do these laws and rules provide the agencies
with any ambition when acting in their judicial capacity that would
counteract their ambition3 when acting in a legislative role? Without
stricter ex parte communication requirements, they do not. Without
a requirement to publish ex parte communications, they do not.
Without a requirement of internal separation of functions, at least
with regard to given cases, they do not. The decision-makers in
these agencies, when acting in their judicial capacities, have no built-
in incentive to resist the lobbyists who may appropriately approach
them when they are acting in their capacity as legislators. If such
lobbyists do approach these decision-makers when they are acting
in their judicial capacity, the decision-makers have no built-in incentive
to publish for other interested parties the contents of the
communication that takes place.3 2 They have no built-in incentive
against participating in a rulemaking proceeding that may directly
affect a matter pending before them in their judicial capacity. They
have no built-in incentive not to communicate with their staff outside
the presence of other vitally interested parties, who are acting as
advocates before them in a judicial matter, and who are often directly
aligned with another party who may not communicate with the
decision-makers.
Thus, we see that even under the considerably flexible approach
to the separation of powers doctrine presented in The Federalist,





32. However, the rules of the Public Service Commission require the publication
of external ex parte communications. See Rule 1.06(b) of the Rules of Practice
and Procedure of the Arkansas Public Service Commission. Notwithstanding the
rule, lobbyists who want to influence the Public Service Commission may do so
through the Commission's staff, which may engage in ex parte communications
with the Commission without the Commission being required to publish such




the Arkansas excepted agencies lack the essential protective component
championed in that document: a means of checking and balancing.
2. The Case Law
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Arkansas Supreme Court
have analyzed the separation of powers doctrine in a number of
contexts with a variety of results.33 Despite the diversity of facts
and outcomes, the cases share one common theme: Governmental
powers may be combined, but where they are, there must be a
limiting factor that will serve to check and balance the combination.
A review of some of the leading cases yields an enlightened analysis
of the Arkansas excepted agencies.
3 4
a. Arkansas Cases
The Arkansas Supreme Court's separation of powers decisions
have at times reflected a rather strict interpretation of the doctrine."
In those instances, the court's analysis has focused on the nature
of the function at issue. 36 For example, in Oates v. Rogers,37 the
Arkansas Supreme Court addressed legislation that gave judges the
power to appoint public officials. Act 137 of 1939 created an office
of collector of taxes in certain counties and provided that the tax
collector would be appointed by the circuit, chancery, and county
33. See infra notes 37-90 and accompanying text.
34. The separation of powers doctrine is directly impacted by the principles
governing the proper delegation of powers. See, e.g., Clinton v. Clinton, 305 Ark.
585, 810 S.W.2d 923 (1991). It is also directly impacted by the "public rights"
doctrine. See, e.g., Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 Howard) 272 (1856). The case law review that follows does not purport
to analyze those issues. Rather, it purports only to highlight some of the leading
cases from which general separation of powers principles and the courts' general
policies can be ascertained.
35. As noted previously, the Arkansas Constitution provides more explicitly for
separation of powers than does the U.S. Constitution. See supra note 20 and
accompanying text. In addition to the more explicit expression of a separation of
powers doctrine in the Arkansas Constitution, one explanation for the Arkansas
Court's stricter results could be that most of the cases in which it has sustained
the challenge have involved an encroachment upon the judicial branch. Traditionally,
the court has accorded greater protection in such instances. In fact, the Arkansas
Supreme Court recently noted: "It has been observed that while we may tolerate
some blurring of lines between the legislative and executive department, this court
has been very protective of the barrier surrounding the judicial department." Spradlin
v. Arkansas Ethics Comm'n, 314 Ark. 108, 115, 858 S.W.2d 684, 687 (1993).
36. The court expressly rejected that approach, however, in Arkansas Motor
Carriers Ass'n v. Pritchett, 303 Ark. 620, 798 S.W.2d 918 (1990); see infra note
52 and accompanying text.
37. 201 Ark. 335, 144 S.W.2d 457 (1940).
1994]
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judges of those counties. The Arkansas Supreme Court held Act
137 unconstitutional on the ground that the delegation to judges of
the responsibility of appointing the tax collector violated the principle
of separation of powers, because that responsibility is not a judicial
function. In so holding, the court stated a restrictive view of the
separation of powers principle: "Our system, providing as it does
for distinct separation of departments, did not in its inception
contemplate a blending of authority; and overlapping must not be
permitted now at the command of expediency or in response to the
nod of convenience."
'38
Similarly, in Spradlin v. Arkansas Ethics Commission,39 the
Arkansas Supreme Court considered legislation that gave nonjudicial
duties to the judicial branch. There, the plaintiff filed an action in
Pulaski County Circuit Court, challenging the constitutionality of
The Standards of Conduct and Disclosure Act for Candidates and
Political Campaigns, 40 which created the Arkansas Ethics Commission.
Section 6 of the Act4 ' provided that the five members of the
Commission would be appointed, one each by the Governor, the
Attorney General, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate. The plaintiff alleged that it would be an
unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine for
the chief justice to appoint a member of a commission that does
not perform a judicial function. The circuit court granted summary
judgment against the plaintiff. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme
Court reversed, sustaining the plaintiff's separation of powers
challenge. The court stated: "We hold that by designating the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court to appoint one of the members of
the Commission, that portion of the Act creating the Commission
violates the separation of powers and is unconstitutional." 42
In Federal Express Corp. v. Skelton43 the court addressed the
constitutionality of legislation that attempted to interpret previous
38. Oates, 201 Ark. at 346, 144 S.W.2d at 458; see also Hartwick v. Thorne,
300 Ark. 502, 780 S.W.2d 531 (1989); Yarbrough v. Yarbrough, 295 Ark. 211,
748 S.W.2d 123 (1988); Wells v. Purcell, 267 Ark. 456, 592 S.W.2d 100 (1979);
Ex Parte Allis, 12 Ark. 101, 7 Eng. 101 (1851); Arkansas v. Hutt, 2 Ark. 282
(1839); Plunkett v. St. Francis Valley Lumber Co., 25 Ark. App. 195, 755 S.W.2d
240 (1988).
39. 314 Ark. 108, 858 S.W.2d 684 (1993).
40. ARuK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-1-101 to -107 (Michie 1993).
41. AiK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-217 (Michie 1993).
42. Spradlin, 314 Ark. at 116, 858 S.W.2d at 688.
43. 265 Ark. 187, 578 S.W.2d 1 (1979).
[Vol. 16:587
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legislation. In a predecessor case, Skelton v. Federal Express Corp.,44
the court had found that an aircraft owned by Federal Express
Corporation was taxable under the Arkansas Compensating Tax
Act.45 After remand, but before the lower court's entry of the new
mandate conforming to the supreme court's decision, the legislature
passed Act 1237 of 1975 (Extended Session), which amended the
Arkansas Compensating Tax Act by exempting certain property,
including aircraft, from taxation under the Act. The language of
the new Act stated that the General Assembly had determined that
"it was not the intent" 4 of the Arkansas Compensating Tax Act
to impose taxes upon certain property such as aircraft.
The Commissioner of Revenues sought relief in the Pulaski
County Chancery Court, alleging that the amending Act violated
the separation of powers doctrine, in that it was an attempt by the
legislature to interpret previous legislation, a function that should
only be performed by the judicial branch. Both the chancery court
and the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld that challenge. The Arkansas
Supreme Court stated:
The relevant portions of [the Arkansas Compensating Tax Act]
were interpreted by this Court in Skelton v. Federal Express
Corporation, 259 Ark. 127, 531 S.W.2d 941 (1976). Sections 2
and 5 of Act 1237 is [sic] a clear attempt by the 1975 General
Assembly to interpret a law enacted by the 1949 General Assembly
after this Court has interpreted and applied that law. We think
this violates the Separation of Powers principle. The legislature
can prospectively change the tax laws of this state, within
constitutional limitations, but it does not have the power or
authority to retrospectively abrogate judicial pronouncements of
the courts of this State by a legislative interpretation of the law.
The 1975 legislature cannot state what the 1949 legislature intended
when it enacted Act 487 of 1949; such interpretation falls exclusively
within the province of the judicial branch. For the 1975 legislature
to declare the intent of a prior legislature and make the declaration
retroactive so as to affect an interpretation already rendered by
the courts is an abuse of legislative power which violates the
Separation of Powers Doctrine.47
These strict applications of the separation of powers doctrine
would seem to militate against the combined functions vested in
44. 259 Ark. 127, 531 S.W.2d 941 (1976).
45. ARiu. CODE ANN. §§ 26-53-101 to -129 (Michie 1987).
46. 1975 Ark. Acts 1237, §§ 2, 5.
47. Federal Express Corp., 265 Ark. at 199, 578 S.W.2d at 7-8 (citing Sidway
v. Lawson, 58 Ark. 117, 23 S.W. 648 (1893)).
19941
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Arkansas's administrative agencies. However, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has struck down separation of powers challenges to the creation
of administrative agencies with combined functions." These decisions
striking the challenges illustrate, nevertheless, an implicit requirement
that in situations where combined functions are allowed, some limiting
factor, a check and balance, must be present.
In Hickenbottom v. McCain4 9 for example, the court addressed
a challenge to Act 391 of 1941, which created the Employment
Security Division as a part of the Department of Labor. The plaintiff
challenged the constitutionality of the Act partially on the ground
that it violated the separation of powers provisions of the Arkansas
Constitution. The basis for the separation of powers argument appears
to have been that the Act created a legislative agency under the
supervision of an executive officer and gave the agency both legislative
and "police" (executive) powers.5 0 The challenger sought to enjoin
enforcement of the Act. The Boone County Chancery Court dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction. In affirming that dismissal, the
Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the constitutional challenges,
holding that the dual functions of the agency did not violate the
separation of powers doctrine. The court's holding was based in
part on its determination that, when legislative power is delegated,
the delegation implicitly confers the power to do that which is deemed
necessary to carry out the delegated legislative power. This essentially
allowed the legislative branch to exercise executive powers in aid of
legislation. The legislative branch's cross-over to the executive branch
was limited in scope and purpose; the agency could only exercise
executive powers that were actually necessary to perform its legislative
powers. This requirement served to check and balance the challenged
combination of functions.
48. See infra notes 49-54 and accompanying text. The results in these cases
may have been reached "in response to the nod of convenience." Oates v. Rogers,
201 Ark. 335, 144 S.W.2d 457 (1940). Given the major role that administrative
agencies play in Arkansas's government, it is not surprising that the court has
found a way to circumvent the separation of powers doctrine, rather than invalidating
the agencies.
49. 207 Ark. 485, 181 S.W.2d 226 (1944).
50. This challenge was not explicitly set forth in the court's opinion; however,
in the analysis upon which the court based its decision, the court made reference
to Lucas v. Futrall, 84 Ark. 540, 106 S.W. 667, 669 (1907), an earlier case in
which such a challenge was expressed. See Hickenbottom, 207 Ark. at 492, 181
S.W.2d at 229. It should also be noted that the Hickenbottom court's analysis
was largely directed at the other constitutional challenge that was raised, i.e., that
the legfslation violated Article XIX, § 9 of the Arkansas Constitution.
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The court dealt with a similar situation in Arkansas Motor
Carriers Ass'n v. Pritchett." Act 67 of 1989 (First Extraordinary
Session) abolished the Transportation Safety Agency and the
Transportation Regulatory Board, which were arms of the legislature,
and transferred their duties to the Arkansas Highway and
Transportation Department and the Arkansas Highway Commission,
arms of the executive branch. The Arkansas Motor Carriers
Association challenged the Act on the ground that the exercise of
legislative functions by agencies that are part of the executive branch
would be a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.5 2 The
court held that the scheme was not unconstitutional. After
acknowledging the Constitution's explicit separation of powers
requirement and the need to protect the interests of the affected
branches, the court found that the legislature's interest was adequately
protected by virtue of the fact that it could withdraw the power
that it had delegated." This power to withdraw the delegated power
served to check and balance the challenged combination of functions.1
4
These Arkansas separation of powers cases, as a body of law,
teach that the court takes the separation of powers doctrine seriously,
but that it will allow some blending of powers provided that some
limiting factor, some means of check and balance, is present.
b. U.S. Supreme Court Cases
The lesson gleaned from a review of the Arkansas cases is
essentially the same one ascertained from a review of the U.S.
Supreme Court cases. 5 Such a review reveals the same common
51. 303 Ark. 620, 798 S.W.2d 918 (1990).
52. Interestingly, the court rejected the idea that the nature of the functions
of the agency in question should be determinant in deciding a separation of powers
challenge. Arkansas Motor Carriers Ass'n, 303 Ark. at 624-25, 798 S.W.2d at 920.
53. Arkansas Motor Carriers Ass'n, 303 Ark. at 625, 798 S.W.2d at 920. The
court did not address protection of the executive branch's interest. If it had done
so, the court's reasoning presumably would have been the same as its reasoning
in addressing protection of the legislative branch's interest.
54. In accord with Hickenbottom and Arkansas Motor Carriers Ass'n are, among
others, Porter v. McCuen, 310 Ark. 562, 839 S.W.2d 512 (1992); Johnson v.
Sunray Serv., Inc., 306 Ark. 497, 816 S.W.2d 582 (1991); Clinton v. Clinton, 305
Ark. 585, 810 S.W.2d 923 (1991); Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Arkansas State Claims
Comm'n, 301 Ark. 451, 784 S.W.2d 771 (1990); Swanberg v. Tart, 300 Ark. 304,
778 S.W.2d 931 (1989).
55. It is important to note at the outset that the U.S. Supreme Court has not
adhered to a strict test or set of rules in its separation of powers analyses. The
Court claims to have explicitly declined to set out a strict test or set of rules in
determining whether Article III courts' domain has been encroached upon. See
Commcrdity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) ("In determining
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thread running through the Court's analyses, despite their differing
results: The effect of the presence or absence of some limiting factor
that would prevent the aggrandizement of one branch at the expense
of another.56 Where such limitations were present, the Court upheld
the challenged scheme; where absent, the Court struck the challenged
scheme.
In the Court's earliest separation of powers cases, its analyses,
like some of the Arkansas Supreme Court's analyses,5 7 were based
on a determination of the nature of the functions that were affected.
In Myers v. United States,58 for example, the Court held that
Congress's attempt to limit the President's power to remove an
executive officer, a postmaster, would unconstitutionally interfere
with the executive branch. Myers argued that removal of an executive
officer required the advice and consent of the Senate. The Court
refused to uphold Congress's limitation on the President's removal
power because it concluded that the postmaster was an exclusively
executive officer and that removal of such officers is within the
President's executive domain.59 Implicit in the Court's analysis was
a determination that if the affected functions were fundamentally
characteristic of the allegedly encroaching branch, then sufficient
limitations were presumptively in place.
The Court gradually shifted its focus from the nature of the
functions at issue to the nature of the encroachments at issue. In
Humphrey's Executor v. United States,60 decided less than a decade
after Myers, the Court upheld Congress's limitation of the President's
power to remove a Federal Trade Commissioner. The difference
between the holdings hinged on the Court's conclusion that Federal
Trade Commissioners, unlike the postmaster in Myers, are not "purely
executive officers ' 6' because the Federal Trade Commission was
created to carry out legislative and judicial, not executive, functions.
the extent to which a given congressional decision to authorize the adjudication
of Article III business in a non-Article III tribunal impermissibly threatens the
institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch, the Court has declined to adopt
formalistic and unbending rules."). However, the Court has employed various
"balancing tests" in some of its separation of powers analyses. See infra note 74
and accompanying text.
56. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 688-91 (1988); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 122 (1976).
57. See supra notes 37-47.
58. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
59. Interestingly, the Court pointed out that the Senate has sufficient opportunity
to check the President's power in the appointment phase.
60. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
61. Id. at 627-28.
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For purposes of an analysis of the Arkansas excepted agencies, the
most significant part of the Humphrey's Executor decision was the
Court's discussion of the dangers that would result from allowing
the President unlimited removal power over officers who are not
purely executive. To allow such unlimited removal power, the Court
held, would be to give the President a "coercive influence ' 62 over
the other branches of government. The Court said: "For it is quite
evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of
another cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of
independence against the latter's will."
63
Drawing this observation into the context of a separation of
powers analysis, the Court continued:
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general
departments of government entirely free from the control or
coercive influence, direct or indirect, of either of the others, has
often been stressed and is hardly open to serious question....
The sound application of a principle that makes one master in
his own house precludes him from imposing his control in the
house of another who is master there. James Wilson, one of the
framers of the Constitution and a former justice of this court,
said that the independence of each department required that its
proceedings "should be free from the remotest influence, direct
or indirect, of either of the other two powers." 64
Humphrey's Executor teaches that the danger of allowing the
executive branch unlimited removal power over officers serving
functions for the other branches would be the lack of protection
against the executive branch's enhanced ability to exercise a coercive
influence over the other branches. What the Court upheld was, in
fact, a limitation on the President's interference with the other
branches.
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,65 where the Court
struck down an act of the President as violative of the separation
of powers doctrine, the Court addressed the danger of allowing
encroachments to go unchecked. Justice Frankfurter stated: "The
accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It does come,
however slowly, from the generative force of unchecked disregard
62. Id. at 630.
63. Id. at 629. Accord, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
64. 295 U.S. at 629-30.
65. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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of the restrictions that fence in even the most disinterested assertion
of authority."' '
Justice Frankfurter's language implies that checked disregard of
boundaries might be permissible. The same implication may be drawn
from language contained in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in
Youngstown. 67 He wrote: "While the Constitution diffuses power
the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will
integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins
upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity.' '68
The Court made the same implication again in Buckley v.
Valeo.69 In Buckley, the Court invalidated a legislative scheme that
allowed Congress to appoint members of the Federal Election
Commission. Because the Commission's most substantial role was
the exercise of powers that were essentially executive in nature, the
Court held that the legislative branch could not appoint its members.
Nevertheless, the Court noted that bodies similar to the Commission,
such as typical administrative agencies, can constitutionally exercise
executive functions when those functions are part of Congress's
legislative function. 70 In that instance, the narrow scope of the exercise
of those functions served as the "check."
The implication drawn from Youngstown and Buckley, that
checked disregard of governmental branch boundaries might be
permissible, has been borne out in numerous Supreme Court separation
of powers analyses since Youngstown in which the Court has upheld,
due to the presence of limiting factors, a variety of encroachments
that have been challenged on the basis of separation of powers. 7'
For example, in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,
72
the Court upheld, against a separation of powers challenge, Congress's
delegation to a lower executive officer the responsibility of regulating
66. 343 U.S. at 594; accord Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928).
67. 343 U.S. at 634.
68. Id. at 635.
69. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
70. Id. at 138; cf. Arkansas Motor Carriers Ass'n v. Pritchett, 303 Ark. 620,
798 S.W.2d 918 (1990); see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text. The decisions since Youngstown
have also been increasingly influenced by the factors of convenience, pragmatism,
and expediency. See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425
(1977); see infra note 72 and accompanying text.
A notable exception to the Court's general trend of striking challenges based
on the separation of powers argument is Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); see infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
72. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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the disposition of presidential papers. In addressing the separation
of powers issue, the Court stated:
[Iln determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance
between the coordinate branches, the proper inquiry focuses on
the extent to which" it prevents the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions. United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S., at 711-712, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039, 94 S. Ct.
3090. Only where the potential for disruption is present must we
then determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding
need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of
Congress.
74
Having applied this balancing test, the Court upheld the challenged
delegation. Even though the Act in question did diminish the
President's power, the diminution was permissible because it was
limited by leaving the power in the executive branch. Interestingly,
the Court postulated that it would be impermissible to delegate the
responsibility to the legislative branch. 75
In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,76 the U.S.
Supreme Court entertained a challenge based on separation of powers
to congressional legislation that allowed the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission to hear pendent and ancillary state common
law claims. The challengers argued that the scheme constituted an
impermissible encroachment by the legislative branch into the judiciary
by allowing a non-Article III tribunal to hear Article III claims.
Bearing out Justice Frankfurter's implications from Youngstown, 77
the Court held that the scheme did not violate the separation of
73. Interestingly, the inquiry is not "whether," but "how much." In Morrison
v. Olson, 437 U.S. 654 (1988), Justice Scalia queried in his dissenting opinion,
"What are the standards to determine how the balance is to be struck, that is,
how much removal of ... power is too much?" Id. at 711 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
[Footnote added by present author.].
74. 433 U.S. at 443. The quoted language appears to have all the attributes
of a balancing test for separation of powers analysis; cf. Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); see discussion supra note 55. The
Court employed other versions of a "balancing test" in Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654 (1988), and in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). For a
criticism of such tests, see Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Morrison, 487 U.S.
at 711 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Justice Scalia's dissents in Morrison
and Mistretta, see Price Marshall, "No Political Truth": The Federalist and Justice
Scalia on the Separation of Powers, 12 U. ARK. LImnE ROCK L.J. 245 (1989-90).
75. 433 U.S. at 444.
76. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
77. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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powers doctrine, largely because sufficient limitations were in place.78
Among those noted by the Court were judicial review, the non-
mandatory nature of the Commission's jurisdiction, the retention
by Article III courts of jurisdiction, and the fact that all essential
attributes of Article III power were left in the Article III courts.
The Court recently followed the Youngstown implication in
Morrison v. Olson 79 and Mistretta v. United States, 0 by upholding
legislative schemes that provided for some measure of encroachment
by one governmental branch upon another' because sufficient limiting
factors were available.
8 2
A major departure from the Court's recent instances of striking
separation of powers challenges is Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co."a It explicitly illustrates the necessity
of a limiting factor in the absence of actual separation. In Northern
Pipeline, a corporation that had filed for reorganization under the
Bankruptcy Code sued another corporation in bankruptcy court for
breach of contract, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, and other
offenses. The defendant corporation moved to dismiss the suit on
the grounds that the Bankruptcy Act of 1978,84 which gave the
bankruptcy court jurisdiction over all civil proceedings arising under
Title 11, was an unconstitutional encroachment by the legislative
branch upon the judiciary, because, through it, Congress gave Article
III jurisdiction to Article I courts. The plaintiff corporation argued
that the grant of jurisdiction was permissible under a line of cases
in which the Court had upheld the creation of "legislative" courts,85
78. 478 U.S. at 852-57; cf. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); see infra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
79. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
80. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
81. Morrison involved, among other issues, a challenge to various aspects of
the Ethics in Government Act on the ground that it encroached upon the President's
executive powers. Mistretta involved a challenge to the Sentencing Reform Act on
the grounds that its creation of the Sentencing Commission and the roles given to
the Commission impermissably encroached upon the judiciary.
82. In Morrison, the Court gave weight to the narrow focus of the cross-over
between branches, the fact that the nature of the functions at issue were characteristic
of the branches by which they would be exercised under the challenged scheme,
and the availability of judicial review. In Mistretta, the Court focused on the nature
of the functions involved in the challenged scheme and gave weight to the fact
that the essential attributes of the branches of government affected were neither
undermined nor expanded.
83. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
84. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1482 (1982).
85. See, e.g., American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (stating
that Congress may create legislative courts to exercise jurisdiction over geographical
604 [Vol. 16:587
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specialized courts,8 6 and courts that operate as adjuncts to Article
III courts.87 The Court rejected the argument, stating: "The flaw
in appellants' analysis is that it provides no limiting principle." 8
The Court noted that, in the cases cited by the appellant, various
built-in limitations had protected against unwarranted encroachment
into Article III territory. 9 Among those limitations were: a specific
and narrowly focused prescription of the manner in which the non-
Article III courts are to exercise Article III functions; an express
limitation of the non-Article III courts' functions so as to reserve
in Article III courts "the essential attributes" of judicial power; the
non-Article III courts' lack of power to enforce their decisions; the
fact that the challenged scheme allowed the non-Article III courts
to hear only cases referred to them by Article III courts; the fact
that Article III courts had the ability to appoint and remove decision-
makers in the non-Article III courts; and the ability of Article III
courts to conduct a de novo review of the non-Article III courts'
decisions. 90 Because no such limiting factors were available in the
areas in which no state operates as sovereign, i.e., United States territories); Dynes
v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857) (stating that Congress may create legislative
courts to establish and exercise courts-martial); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855) (stating that Congress may
create legislative courts to exercise jurisdiction over public rights).
86. See, e.g., Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22 (1932).
88. 458 U.S. at 73.
89. Id. at 80-81.
90. The judiciary's ability to conduct de novo review of state agencies' legislative
and executive decisions has been held unconstitutional in Arkansas as a violation
of the separation of powers doctrine (judicial encroachment upon the legislative
and executive branches). See, e.g., Arkansas Comm'n on Pollution Control and
Ecology v. Land Developers, 284 Ark. 179, 680 S.W.2d 909 (1984); Goodall v.
Williams, 271 Ark. 354, 609 S.W.2d 25 (1980); Wenderoth v. City of Ft. Smith,
251 Ark. 342, 472 S.W.2d 74 (1971). However, the Arkansas Supreme Court has
expressly stated that the holding of those cases does not extend to the review of
administrative agencies' adjudicatory decisions. McCammon v. Boyer, 285 Ark.
288, 686 S.W.2d 421 (1985). In fact, the McCammon court stated: "If de novo
review of actions by administrative boards and commissions were not allowed, a
board or commission might act arbitrarily or unreasonably or even conceal the
real facts and thereby protect such acts from proper review." 285 Ark. at 293,
686 S.W.2d at 424. Nevertheless, the laws and rules governing the Arkansas excepted
agencies (other than the Highway Commission) do not provide for de novo review
of those agencies' adjudicatory decisions. In fact, judicial review of such decisions
is limited. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-2-423(c)(4) (Michie Supp. 1993); Section
V of the Administrative Procedures for the Arkansas State Board of Health and
the Arkansas State Department of Health; ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-71 l(b)(4) (Michie
1987); Arkansas State Bank Comm'n v. Bank of Marvell, 304 Ark. 602, 804 S.W.2d
692 (1991). Procedures before the Highway Commission are subject to de novo
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bankruptcy court, the Court sustained the separation of powers
challenge.
The U.S. Supreme Court's decisions demonstrate a separation
of powers jurisprudence like that described in The Federalist and
employed by the Arkansas Supreme Court, which allows some blending
of powers, but which, in the absence of actual separation of powers,
requires some other limiting factor to provide checks and balances.
That requirement gave rise to the administrative procedure acts.
B. The Administrative Procedure Acts: Substitute for Separation
of Powers
Concern about the combination of functions in administrative
agencies became apparent immediately upon proposal of the first
agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission. 9' In the Congressional
debate over the creation of that agency, Representative Oates stated:
"I believe it is absolutely unconstitutional and void, because to my
mind it is a blending of the legislative, the judicial, and perhaps,
the executive powers of the government in the same law." '92 Similar
concerns were still prevalent in 1937, when a special Congressional
committee presented, upon request, a report to President Roosevelt
on the subject of administrative agencies. The report is particularly
reflective of traditional concerns about the combination of functions
in administrative agencies. It stated:
The independent regulatory commissions create a confusing and
difficult situation in the field of national administration. There
is a conflict of principle involved in their make-up and functions.
They suffer from an internal inconsistency, an unsoundness of
basic theory.
The evils resulting from this confusion of principles are insidious
and far-reaching. In the first place, governmental powers of great
importance are being exercised under conditions of virtual
irresponsibility. We speak of the "independent" regulatory
commissions. It would be more accurate to call them the
"irresponsible" regulatory commissions, for they are areas of
unaccountability. It is not enough to point out that these
review. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-2-425 (Michie 1987); Arkansas Commerce Comm'n
v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 247 Ark. 1032, 448 S.W.2d 950 (1970). However, even
those de novo reviews are limited in scope. See Acme Brick Co. v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 307 Ark. 363, 821 S.W.2d 7 (1991).
91. See 49 U.S.C §§ 10521-11917 (1988).
92. 18 CoNG. REc. 848 (1886).
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irresponsible commissions have of their own volition been honest
and competent. Power without responsibility has no place in a
government based on the theory of democratic control, for
responsibility is the people's only weapon, their only insurance
against abuse of power.
[Tihe independent commission is obliged to carry on judicial
functions under conditions which threaten the impartial
performance of that judicial work. The discretionary work of the
administrator is merged with that of the judge. Pressures and
influences properly enough directed toward officers responsible
for formulating and administering policy constitute an unwholesome
atmosphere in which to adjudicate private rights. But the mixed
duties of the commissions render escape from these subversive
influences impossible.
Furthermore, the same men are obliged to serve both as
prosecutors and as judges. This not only undermines judicial
fairness; it weakens public confidence in that fairness. Commission
decisions affecting private rights and conduct lie under the suspicion
of being rationalizations of the preliminary findings which the
commission, in the role of prosecutor, presented to itself.
The independent commission, in short, provides the proper
working conditions neither for administration nor for adjudication.
It fails to provide responsibility for the first; it does not provide
complete independence for the second."'
The concerns expressed in the report to President Roosevelt
eventually culminated in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act94
with its protective provisions. 95 The aim of those provisions was to
achieve some measure of the protection against unfairness that had
been lost when the governmental functions were combined. Their
goal was to prevent situations that are unfair to the litigants who
appear before the agencies. 96 For example, Section 554(d) of the Act
prohibits any agency employee from performing more than one
function in connection with a given case. Sections 554(d) and 557(d)(1)
prohibit ex parte communications between those who perform
investigative functions and those who perform decision-making
functions. Section 557(d)(1)(C) requires the publication of the contents
of any ex parte communication that takes place.
93. S. Doc. No. 118, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937).
94. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988).
95. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d), 557(d)(1) (1988).
96. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950); see also Grolier
v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 615 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980).
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The Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act 97 contains similar
provisions," also intended to provide safeguards against the unfairness
that can result from the combination of functions in administrative
agencies. The most important safeguards against such unfairness are
the prohibition against ex parte communications," the requirement
that ex parte communications be published,10° and the requirement
that an agency's record reveal all bases for its decisions.1'0
97. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-15-201 to -210 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1993).
98. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-15-208 to -210 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1993). However,
the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act does not contain a provision prohibiting
dual functions in a given case.
99. The prohibition against ex parte communications states:
(a) Unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters authorized
by law, members or employees of an agency assigned to render a decision
or to make final or proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law in
any case of adjudication shall not communicate, directly or indirectly, in
connection with any issue of fact with any person or party nor, in
connection with any issue of law, with any party or his representative,
except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate.
(b) An agency member may:
(1) Communicate with other members of the agency; and
(2) Have the aid and advice of one (1) or more personal assistants.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-209 (Michie 1992). Although paragraph (b) is troubling,
it is less so because of the provisions of ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 25-15-208(a)(5)(F),
-210 (Michie 1992 & Supp. 1993), see infra notes 100-01, and because of the holding
of Arkansas Alcoholic Beverage Control Div. v. Cox, 306 Ark. 82, 811 S.W.2d
305 (1991) (requiring ex parte communications to be placed in the record.).
100. The requirements of publication state:
(5) The record shall include:
(F) All staff memoranda or data submitted to the hearing officer or
members of an agency in connection with their consideration of the case.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-208(a)(5)(F) (Michie Supp. 1993).
101. The requirement that the bases for decisions be revealed states:
(a) When, in a case of adjudication, a majority of the officials of the
agency who are to render the decision have not heard the case or read
the record, the decisions, if adverse to a party other than the agency,
shall not be made until a proposal for decision is served upon the parties
and an opportunity is afforded to each party adversely affected to fileexceptions and present briefs and oral argument to the officials who are
to render the decision. The proposal for decision shall contain a statement
of the reasons therefore and of each issue of fact or law necessary thereto,
prepared by the person who conducted the hearing.
(b) (1) In every case of adjudication, a final decision or order shall be
in writing or stated in the record.
(2) A final decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law,
separately stated. Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall
be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts
supporting the findings. If, in accordance with agency rules, a party
submitted proposed findings of fact, the decision shall include a ruling
[Vol. 16:587
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For the Arkansas agencies governed by the Act, these provisions
arguably'0 2 serve adequately to replace the lost protection of keeping
the branches of government strictly separate. However, the agencies
that are not governed by the Act do not have this replacement
protection. The possibility of unfairness is therefore heightened in
proceedings before those agencies. They have neither the protection
of actual separation of functions, nor the protection of statutorily
imposed internal separation of functions. 03 The only available
safeguard against unfairness in those agencies' proceedings, then,
may be the imposition of a strict standard by the appellate courts
who review those agencies' proceedings.
III. THE "APPEARANCE OF FAIRNESS" STANDARD 'VERSUS
"ACTUAL UNFAIRNESS' AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INTEGRITY
Most challenges to the combination of functions that exists in
administrative agencies have been based on an argument that the
combination of functions and attendant ex parte communications
resulted in a violation of due process.' °4 That is, the challengers
have argued that the situation denied them a fair trial. 05 In addressing
such challenges, the courts have generally applied either an "ap-
pearance of fairness" standard or an "actual unfairness" standard.
Some courts have applied a hybrid of the two standards, which is
based upon a presumption of the integrity of the decisionmakers.
A review of some of the cases indicates that in the absence of other
limiting factors, or checks and balances, an application of the "ap-
upon each proposed finding.
(c) Parties shall be served either personally or by mail with a copy of
any decision or order.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-15-210 (Michie 1992).
102. See supra note 8.
103. Or even "parchment barriers." THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 254 (James
Madison)(Wesleyan Univ. Press ed., 1961).
104. See infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
105. In the context of such a challenge, the threshold question, of course, is
whether the challenger is entitled to due process in an administrative proceeding.
It is well-settled that administrative proceedings, even though quasi-judicial in nature,
must comply with the requirements of due process. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973); Amos Treat v.
Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Madden v. United
States Assoc., 40 Ark. App. 143, 844 S.W.2d 374 (1992). The courts have, however,
differentiated between rulemaking proceedings and adjudicative proceedings, as well
as between cases involving private rights and those involving public rights, in ruling
as to the type of process that was due. See Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420




pearance of fairness" standard is the most appropriate means of
supplying a check and balance. If administrative decision-makers are
aware that a decision can be vacated by a finding that the proceeding
involved an appearance of unfairness, they will have an incentive
to avoid such appearances.
A. The Presumption of Integrity
A review of the standards employed by the courts in addressing
due process challenges to the combination of functions in
administrative agencies must begin with Withrow v. Larkin,'°0 in
which the United States Supreme Court held that a combination of
functions in administrative agencies, in and of itself, does not violate
due process. In that case, a U.S. district court issued an order
enjoining the Wisconsin State Examining Board from holding
proceedings to investigate a doctor's compliance with certain statutes
and enjoining the board from suspending his license to practice
medicine. One of the grounds for the injunction was that it would
be a denial of due process for the Board to suspend the doctor's
license at its own hearing on charges that arose from its own
investigation. In other words, the Board could not act as both
prosecutor and judge because combining those two functions would
be unconstitutional.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case. The Court did not go so far as to apply an "actual unfairness"
standard, which would have required a showing of actual bias on
the part of the decisionmakers. In fact, the Court acknowledged its
previous holding in In Re Murchison'" 7 that "justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice."'' ' However, the Court did create a
difficult standard for establishing due process violations arising outof administrative agencdes' ................... T... Court. hclA ,tha
...- 5 - _. . Au L &4 L J . A i, .~ I. i1*'i L114
one who contends that this combination "without more"' 9 violates
the Constitution has the difficult burden of overcoming "a
presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as
adjudicators"110 and must show that "the probability of actual bias
on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be
106. 421 U.S. 35 (1975).
107. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
108. Id. at 136.
109. 421 U.S. at 58.
110. Id. at 47.
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constitutionally tolerable.""'' Numerous decisions have followed
Withrow or have employed similar reasoning."
' 2
B. The Appearance of Fairness Standard
Despite Withrow and its progeny, other courts have applied a
less stringent "appearance of fairness" standard in determining
whether an administrative agency's combination of functions has
violated the challenger's due process rights. Those courts have required
only a showing that the challenged proceedings appeared to be unfair.
For example, in Utica Packing Co. v. Block," 3 which involved the
prosecution of a meat packing company, an administrative law judge
in the Department of Agriculture rendered a decision that was
unfavorable to the Department. Thereafter, the Secretary of
Agriculture replaced the administrative law judge with a person who
was not a lawyer and who had never performed adjudicatory or
other legal work. A lawyer whose direct supervisor had been involved
with the investigation and prosecution of the packing company and
with the removal of the administrative law judge was appointed to
assist the replacement judge. The Department then filed a motion
for reconsideration. The new judge rendered a decision that was
favorable to the Department and resulted in the revocation of a
meat packing company's entitlement to receive inspection service.
On appeal, the packing company argued that the replacement of
the judge with personnel who had previously been involved with the
company's prosecution, though indirectly, had resulted in a violation
of the company's due process right to a fair trial. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed, stating: "The
requirement of a fair trial before a fair tribunal . .. requires the
appearance of fairness and the absence of a probability of outside




112. See, e.g., Kessler Food Mkt. v. NLRB, 868 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1989); Cobb
v. Yeutter, 889 F.2d 724 (6th Cir. 1989); Hercules v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C.
Cir. 1978); Doe v. Hampton, 566 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1977); FTC v. Cinderella
Career & Finishing Sch., 404 F.2d 1308 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Pangburn v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 311 F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1962); United States ex rel. Catalano v.
Shaughnessy, 197 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1952).
113. 781 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1986).
114. 781 F.2d at 77. The court also stated: "With regard to judicial decision-
making, whether by court or agency, the appearance of bias or pressure may be
no less objectionable than the reality." Id. at 78 (quoting D.C. Fed'n of Civic




Interestingly, the Utica Court did not attempt to discredit the
Withrow Court's strict standard; instead, it simply enlarged the
standard by determining that Withrow's category of cases in which
"the probability of actual bias is too high to be constitutionally
tolerable ' " 5 includes fact situations that carry an appearance of
unfairness."
6
Another example of a court's application of the "appearance
of fairness" standard is Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission. 7 In that case, the Securities and Exchange Commission
-ordered a hearing on the issue of whether Amos Treat & Co.'s
registration as a broker-dealer should be revoked for noncompliance
with the Securities and Exchange Act." 8 Amos Treat & Co. moved
to discontinue the proceedings and to disqualify a member of the
Commission on the grounds that he had participated in the
investigatory process and had engaged in ex parte communications
with the staff who was conducting the prosecution of the case. The
motion was denied. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, stating:
It is not enough that here no corruption has been charged, indeed
appellants expressly disclaim personal bias and prejudice. What
must control is the policy ... that the investigative as well as
the prosecuting arm of the agency must be kept separate from
115. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
116. 781 F.2d at 77. The Withrow decision leaves several other avenues that
could be used to avoid its strict standard. For example, the decision encourages
other courts addressing the same issue to make their decisions based on the particular
facts of the case, taking into consideration "local realities." 421 U.S. at 58. The
decisions of the Unites States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reflect the
varying results brought about by differences in particular facts. For example,
compare Arnericai Cyanaiid Co. v. FTiC, 363 F.2d 757 (6t1- Cir. 1966) with
Kessler Food Mkts. v. NLRB, 868 F.2d 881 (6th Cir. 1989).
Also, the Court made a point of noting the protective impact of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, 421 U.S. at 52, implying that combined functions in
administrative agencies could be challenged on the grounds of statutory violations,
where such statutory protections are available, without resorting to a constitutional
challenge. See Grolier v. FTC, 615 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980). The further implication
of this point, of course, is that where such statutory protections are not available,
such as in the Arkansas excepted agencies, constitutional principles are more sus-
ceptible to violation.
Finally, of particular import in an analysis of the Arkansas excepted agencies
is the fact that the Withrow court distinguished the prior cases in which due process
violations had been found. 421 U.S. at 50 n.16. Interestingly, each of the cases
distinguished by the Court involved a situation similar to that which exists or can
easily exist in the Arkansas excepted agencies.
117. 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).




[A]n administrative hearing . . . must be attended, not only with
every element of fairness but with the very appearance of complete
fairness. Only thus can the tribunal conducting a quasi-adjudicatory
proceeding meet the basic requirement of due process." 9
Similarly, in American Cyanamid Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission,20 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that a commissioner's participation in both the
investigative and decision-making phases of a proceeding violated
due process. In American Cyanamid, a drug company that was being
prosecuted for violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act moved
to disqualify one of the Federal Trade Commissioners from
participating in the decision-making process in the case because he
had served as counsel to the Senate subcommittee that had investigated
the relevant facts and issues. The motions were denied, and the
Commission entered an order that was unfavorable to the drug
company. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
vacated the order and remanded for rehearing without the participation
of the commissioner in question. In so holding, the court stated:
"It is fundamental that both unfairness and the appearance of
unfairness should be avoided. Wherever there may be a reasonable
suspicion of unfairness, it is best to disqualify.' ' 2
C. Uncertainty in the Arkansas Standard
In addressing the issue of combined functions in administrative
agencies, the Arkansas courts have employed both the "appearance
of fairness" standard and the "actual unfairness" standard. Some
of the recent decisions in which the courts have applied the "actual
unfairness" standard reveal a judicial concern about the unchecked
119. 306 F.2d at 266-67.
120. 363 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966).
121. Id. at 767 (citing Comment, Prejudice and the Administrative Process, 59
Nw. U. L. REv. 216, 231 (1964); Robert N. Covington, Disqualification of Ad-
ministrative Officials for Bias, 13 VAND. L. REV. 713, 727 (1960)).
Other cases in which violations of due process have been found to arise out
of circumstances that resulted from a combination of functions in administrative
agencies are Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); HBO v. FCC,
567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Cinderella Career & Finishing Sch. v. FTC, 425 F.2d
583 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Camero v. United States, 375 F.2d 777 (U.S. Ct. Cl. 1967);
Texaco, Inc. v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), vacated on other grounds,
381 U.S. 739 (1965); Sangamon Valley Tel. Corp. v. United States, 269 F.2d 221
(D.C. Cir. 1959); Trans World Airlines v. CAB, 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
King v. Caesar Rodney Sch. Dist., 380 F. Supp. 1112 (Del. 1974).
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combination of functions in administrative agencies and portend the
possibility of a shift toward favoring an "appearance of fairness"
standard.
In General Telephone Co. v. Arkansas Public Service
Commission, 22 a telephone company petitioned the Public Service
Commission for a rate increase. After the Commission granted an
increase, the Commission's staff requested a rehearing of the order,
and the Commission reduced the amount of the increase. The company
appealed the reduction, arguing that the Commission's staff should
not have standing as an adversarial party before the Commission
to file a request for rehearing. The court rejected the argument,
finding no evidence of actual bias as a result of the staff's participation
as a party. However, the court said:
It is troublesome that an agency which is placed in a decision-
making role can have its own staff before it as a party. Even
if the internal operating procedures of the commission kept the
commissioners totally isolated from their staff, and we assume
that is not the case, we would find a serious appearance of
impropriety in this situation. It is a little like a judge making
his or her law clerk a party to a case even though the law clerk
has a close association with the judge, is his or her employee,
and has the judge's ear before and after the hearing. We have
real doubts about this situation ... 123
The Arkansas Court of Appeals reached similar results regarding
the staff's status as a party in AEEC v. Arkansas Public Service
Commission 24 and in Fowler v. Arkansas Public Service
Commission. 12
5
In AEEC, an association of large industrial customers of Arkansas
Power & Light appealed from a Public Service Commission decision
anroving a settlement agreement that had the effect of restructuring
certain aspects of AP&L's business, with a resulting impact on the
members of the association. One of the bases for appeal was the
contention by the association that the Commission's staff had
participated in ex parte communications with AP&L regarding a
settlement agreement, and that the participation of the staff as a
party in the proceeding after such communications had the effect
of denying the association due process. The court rejected the
122. 295 Ark. 595, 751 S.W.2d 1 (1988).
123. Id. at 601-02, 757 S.W.2d at 4.
124. 35 Ark. App. 47, 813 S.W.2d 263 (1991).
125. 31 Ark. App. 155, 790 S.W.2d 183 (1990).
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contention on the grounds that the association had not established
actual unfairness. 
2 6
Similarly, the Arkansas Court of Appeals found no actual
unfairness in Fowler. In that case, certain parties in a case pending
before the Public Service Commission filed an objection with the
Commission, seeking to have the Commission's staff disqualified
from participation in the case while it was pending before the
Commission. The Commission overruled the objection, and the parties
appealed. The Commission's staff filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal on the grounds that the order overruling the objection to
the staff's participation was not a final, appealable order as required
by Rule 2 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The
Arkansas Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, noting that the
appellants' rights had not actually been prejudiced at that stage of
the proceedings. However, the concurring opinion pointed out that
not only had the Arkansas Supreme Court "looked askance,' 2 7 in
General Telephone, at the issue of the Public Service Commission's
staff's participation in proceedings before the Commission, 28 but
also that the issue of impropriety would likely arise again and that
there may be cases in which the litigants' rights would be so affected
by such matters as the staff's participation that the litigants should
not be required to waste their time in proceedings before the Public
Service Commission. 2 9 The concurring opinion cautioned that the
court should remain "acutely aware"' 30 of the "continuum of
litigant's[sic] rights in Public Service Commission cases .... "I
Nevertheless, the concurring justice noted that the appellants' rights
did not appear to be prejudiced at that stage of the case. This was,
in essence, a holding (in concurrence with the majority) that there
was no actual unfairness.
In contrast to the decisions in General Telephone, AEEC, and
Fowler, the Arkansas Supreme Court has applied the "appearance
of fairness" standard when it has approached the combination of
functions issue from an ethical 3 2 standpoint. For example, Madden
126. The court also noted that the contention was untimely because AEEC
participated in the proceedings for four months before raising the claim and that
the untimeliness alone would be enough to reject the claim.
127. 31 Ark. App. at 158, 790 S.W.2d at 184 (Rogers, J., concurring).
128. Id.
129. 31 Ark. App. at 159, 790 S.W.2d at 185 (Rogers, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 158, 790 S.W.2d at 185.
131. Id.
132. The Arkansas Code of Judicial Conduct implicitly applies to administrative
decision-makers. The section of the Code entitled "Application of The Code of
1994]
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v. United States Ass'ns arose out of proceedings before the Arkansas
Securities Department 3 4 to determine whether the appellees' securities
registration and licenses should be revoked. During the course of
the proceedings, the hearing officer who decided the case engaged
in ex parte communications with the attorney for the Department
and other members of the Department who were prosecuting the
case. Subsequently, the Department entered a decision revoking the
registration and licenses. On review of the case, the Pulaski County
Circuit Court reversed the Department's decision, finding that the
ex parte communications between the decision-maker and advocates
had the effect of denying the appellees a fair trial. The Arkansas
Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the communication had not
only violated the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act, but also
had violated the ethical principle of the "appearance of fairness."
In support of its decision, the Madden court cited Acme Brick Co.
v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.35 Acme began as a proceeding
before the Arkansas Highway Commission upon a petition by the
Missouri Pacific Railroad Company to discontinue a spur track that
provided service to the Acme Brick Company. The Commission
granted the petition. Acme Brick Company then filed a motion for
reconsideration and a motion to recuse based on the fact that the
counsel for the railroad company was also representing the Commission
on two pending matters. 36 The circuit court affirmed the Commission's
Judicial Conduct" provides: "Anyone, whether or not a lawyer, who is an officer
of a judicial system and who performs judicial functions, including an officer such
as a magistrate, court commissioner, special master, or referee, is a judge within
the meaning of this Code. . . ." ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1994).
Although the quoted language does not specify administrative judges as being
within the Code's governance, the language certainly describes administrative judges.
Moreover, the Arkansas Supreme Court has indicated that, although the Code of
Judicial Conduct does not expressly state that administrative judges are subject to
its provisions, such judges should, by analogy, be subject to the Code because
they perform quasi-judicial functions. See Acme Brick Co. v. Missouri Pac. R.R.
Co., 307 Ark. 363, 368, 821 S.W.2d 7, 10 (1992); International Paper Co. v.
Wilson, 34 Ark. App. 87, 805 S.W.2d 668 (1991); First Am. Carriers, Inc. v.
Kroger Co., 302 Ark. 86, 787 S.W.2d 669 (1990).
133. 40 Ark. App. 143, 844 S.W.2d 374 (1992).
134. The Arkansas Securities Department is governed by the Arkansas Admin-
istrative Procedure Act.
135. 307 Ark. 363, 821 S.W.2d 7 (1991).
136. This is a situation that can occur regularly in the Arkansas excepted agencies.
For example, the staff of the Public Service Commission represents the Commission
in appeals of the Commission's decisions to the Arkansas Court of Appeals, even
though the staff not only appeared before the Commission as an advocate in the
matter, but may also have taken a position contrary to the Commission's decision.
See, e.g., AT&T Communications, Inc. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 40 Ark.
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decision, but found that the commissioners should have recused. On
appeal, Acme argued that the circuit court committed error in
affirming the Commission's decision, because the dual representation
violated the appearance of fairness standard. The Arkansas Supreme
Court determined first that the appearance of fairness standard was
the proper standard by which the situation should be judged. The
court further found that the dual representation had violated the
appearance of fairness standard. In making this finding, the court
pointed out that the appearance of fairness standard is rooted in
the Code of Judicial Conduct and applies to administrative agencies.
137
Nevertheless, the court affirmed the lower court's decision on the
basis of the "rule of necessity," which holds that administrative
decision-makers are not disqualified despite their bias where they
alone have the authority to decide the case in question. 3 ' Because
no procedure existed for the appointment of special commissioners
to hear Acme's case, the court held, the commissioners were correct
in not recusing.
Notably, the Arkansas cases in which the court has found a
violation of the "appearance of fairness" standard have involved
both Arkansas excepted agencies and agencies that are governed by
the Administrative Procedure Act. Yet the Court has appropriately
applied the same ethical standards to both; ethical requirements'
App. 126, 843 S.W.2d 855 (1992)(Arkansas Public Service Commission Docket No.
90-209-U, In the Matter of Coinless Local Exchange Service By Means of Customer-
Provided Coinless Telephones).
137. 307 Ark. at 368, 821 S.W.2d at 10; accord International Paper Co. v.
Wilson, 34 Ark. App. 87, 805 S.W.2d 668 (1991); First Am. Carriers, Inc. v.
Kroger Co., 302 Ark. 363, 821 S.W.2d 669 (1990); Arkansas Racing Comm'n v.
Emprise Corp., 254 Ark. 975, 497 S.W.2d 34 (1973). Some federal courts have
also recognized the ethical implications of administrative commingling. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Tamper, 522 F.2d 781, 789 (4th Cir. 1975);. Camero v. United States,
375 F.2d 777 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
138. 307 Ark. at 369.
139. The unchecked combination of functions and ex parte communications in
the Arkansas excepted agencies implicate both the Arkansas Code of Judicial
Conduct and the Arkansas Rules of Professional Conduct for lawyers. The lack
of protections in these agencies results in inherent violations of both codes. These
built-in violations present ethical problems for the administrative decision-makers
and for their staffs who appear before them as advocates.
More specifically, the lack of limitations in the Arkansas excepted agencies
inherently violates at least three canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon
I-"A Judge Should Uphold the Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary;"
Canor 2--"A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety
In All of the Judge's Activities;" and Canon 3--"A Judge Should Perform the
Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently." ARK. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canons 1-3 (1994). At least one of the rules of the Model Rules of
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have transcended statutory ones. These cases bring into sharp focus
the conflict between the requirements of the codes of ethics and the
unimpeded commingling in the Arkansas excepted agencies. The ex
parte communications in Madden were at least also prohibited by
the laws governing the agency in that case.140 In Acme Brick, by
contrast, the laws of the agency did not prohibit the relationship
between the agency and the appellees that the Court found to be
unlawful.
The requirements of Arkansas's codes of ethics should be a
minimum standard for those who are governed by the codes, including
personnel in administrative agencies. Currently, the laws governing
the Arkansas excepted agencies do not rise to that minimum level.
D. Which Standard Should the Arkansas Courts Apply?
All of the cases discussed above in which due process violations
were found 41 involved situations that are not prohibited and, in
fact, do occur in the Arkansas excepted agencies. Employees of
those agencies may perform dual functions on the same case.
Moreover, while acting in one capacity, such as advocate, they may
communicate with other agency employees who are acting in another
capacity, such as decision-maker. If such a communication takes
place, the decision-maker is not required to make the substance of
that communication known to other interested parties. Some
employees, such as the staff of the Public Service Commission, are
employed at the pleasure of the decision-makers. Situations such as
these have been held to violate due process by appearing to be
unfair. Indeed, because of the absence of any protective provisions
in these agencies, the probability of unfairness is heightened, thus
rendering the situation subject to challenge even under the Withrow
standard. 42 Given these precedents, if the Arkansas courts are faced
with the serious due process implications presented by such an
appearance and probability of unfairness, the only way that the
courts can avoid sustaining a challenge to proceedings conducted
under these circumstances will be to presume the integrity of the
decision-makers, as did the Withrow Court.
Professional Conduct for lawyers is also inherently violated by the lack of limitations:
Rule 3.5-"A lawyer shall not (a)seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror
or other official; or (b)communicate ex parte with such a person on the merits of
the cause .. " ARK. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RtLE 3.5 (1994).
140. In other words, there would have been a basis for relief without resorting
to ethical principles. See Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 615 F.2d 1215 (9th Cir. 1980).
141. See supra notes 113-20, 133-35, and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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The Withrow Court stated: "Without a showing to the contrary,
state administrators 'are assumed to be men of conscience and
intellectual discipline, capable of judging a particular controversy
fairly on the basis of its own circumstances. '"1 43 The Court further
stated that challengers to combined functions should have to "convince
that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers
on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment
that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process
is to be adequately implemented."'"
The troubling aspect of the Withrow Court's presumption of
integrity is that it is contrary to the fundamental premises upon
which the separation of powers doctrine was founded. The presumption
can therefore be used to avoid providing both the protections of
the doctrine and any substitute protections, such as those included
in the administrative procedure acts, thus allowing an unlimited
concentration of powers in the hands of one person or group of
people. This is the very situation that the separation of powers
doctrine sought to avoid.
45
The Federalist indicates that James Madison and the other
drafters of the United States Constitution may have engaged in the
very type of "realistic appraisal" to which the Withrow Court
referred.1' 6 In any event, Madison evidently had thought about
"psychological tendencies and human weakness"'' 47 enough to be
unwilling to presume inherent human fairness, for after describing
a system of checks and balances, he wrote:
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should
be necessary to controul the abuses of government. But what is
government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary.
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controuls
on government would be necessary. In framing a government
which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty
lies in this: You must first enable the government to controul
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to controul itself.
143. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 55 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 313
U.S. 409, 421 (1941)); see also Porter County Chapter v. Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1363, 1371 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Sexton v. Arkansas Supreme Court
Comm. on Professional Conduct, 299 Ark. 439, 446, 774 S.W.2d 114, 118 (1989).
144. 421 U.S. at 47.
145. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.




A dependence on the people is no doubt the primary controul
on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity
of auxiliary precautions.1'4
Interestingly, our legal system has generally opted for Madison's
approach to presumptions about human nature. We do not even
presume the integrity of our most highly regarded federal judges.
Stringent rules are in place to prevent them from doing the very
things that are not prohibited in the Arkansas excepted agencies,
with strict penalties for violation. To accord a higher regard for
administrative judges and personnel is fallacious.
The U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in In Re Murchison, 49 the
case that virtually every court, including the Withrow Court, has
cited in addressing the combination of functions issue, 50 reflected
a Madisonian reluctance about human nature, as well. In that case,
the Court said:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.
Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial
of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent
even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can be
a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases
where he has an interest in the outcome. That interest cannot
be defined with precision. Circumstances and relationships must
be considered. This Court has said, however, that "every procedure
which would offer a possible temptation to the average man as
a judge . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between
the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law."
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532. Such a stringent rule may
sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who
would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally
between contending parties. But to perform its high function in
the best way "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14.'1'
The unchecked "circumstances and relationships"'5 2 that exist
in the Arkansas excepted agencies are the very type that would
148. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Wesleyan Univ. Press
ed., 1961).
149. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
150. Murchison did not involve an administrative agency. It involved a state law
that allowed the same judge to sit as a "one-man grand jury" and subsequently
to preside over a contempt hearing which arose out of the grand jury proceedings.




"offer a temptation to the average man as a judge. . .not to hold
the balance nice, clear and true"' 53 in making adjudications. Moreover,
the actual unfairness that occurs in a combined function setting
often takes a subtle form, rarely appears patently on the record,
and is virtually impossible to document. As one commentator queried
in discussing an administrative agency situation in which both
advocates and decision-makers report to the same person:
Might this not compromise the independence of one or another
of these groups? Moreover, the agency staff might view itself as
a group, thus generating loyalties and esprit de corps which transcend
the barriers on an organizational chart. Can "isolated" parts of
an organization hope to function neutrally when their members
ride the same bus to work, work in adjoining offices, share coffee
breaks and lunches, and move in the same social circles?"N
Indeed, it is precisely because of the human tendency to favor
those with whom one has a relationship that special interest groups
are willing to and do spend substantial amounts on lobbyists for the
expressed purpose of developing relationships with members of the
legislative and executive branches of government. When the legislative
and executive functions are combined, without limitations, with the
judicial function, these political forces can just as easily be used to
influence a commissioner acting in a judicial capacity. To allow such
influences to sway the judicial branch destroys all incentive' for
imposing an internal separation of functions, and, more importantly,
it undermines the underlying purpose for maintaining separateness as
well. Not only does it weaken the public's confidence in the agencies'
decisions,3 6 but it initiates the process of aggrandizement. The tyranny
feared by the founding fathers, although not accomplished "in a
day, " 7 has begun, "however slowly.' '18
If the courts simply presume the integrity of state agency
commissioners, decision-makers, and advocates and turn a blind eye
toward the subtle relationships that can influence them, either
intentionally or unintentionally, and toward the political forces that
are exerted upon them, neither actual fairness nor the appearance
of fairness can be maintained.
153. Id.
154. BREYER & STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 731
(1979).
155. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
156. See FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 567 F.2d 96, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1977).




The Arkansas Supreme Court expressed concern about the exertion
of political influences on those who have combined functions in
Oates v. Rogers,'3 9 the separation of powers case discussed
previously. '60 The Court there said:
In most instances judges are - and in all cases they should be
- free from political pressure and beyond the reach of partisan
influence.
Common knowledge teaches, and experience informs us, that
most people who apply for public office have the backing of
influential friends, and are themselves prominently connected.
Unfortunately we have not reached that ideal state where friend
interested in friend will circumscribe his or her activity merely
because the appointive power is judicial. Judges should not be
subjected to these experiences.' 6
V. CONCLUSION
The judges in the Arkansas excepted agencies are subjected to
those experiences, and the Arkansas Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged as much. 62 The court, in fact, has gone beyond the "suspicion"
of unfairness against which the American Cyanamid court cau-
tioned;163 it has expressed an assumption that internal agency se-
parations are not being maintained.'" The unchecked combination
of functions in the Arkansas excepted agencies not only presents
potential due process problems with proceedings held under such
circumstances, but also poses ethical problems for both administrative
decision-makers and advocates. In the absence of doctrinal or stat-
utory protection against such infirmities, the appellate courts can
supply the lacking protection against the resulting possibility of
unfairness by applying an "appearance of fairness" Standard in
addressing challenges to these agencies' proceedings. The application
of such a standard will provide the Arkansas excepted agencies with
incentive to take affirmative steps toward ensuring the fairness of
their procedures.
159. 201 Ark. 335, 144 S.W.2d 457 (1940).
160. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
161. 201 Ark. at 346, 144 S.W.2d at 462.
162. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
163. American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1966).
164. General Tel. Co. v. Arkansas Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 295 Ark. 595, 601-02,
757 S.W.2d 4 (1988).
[Vol. 16:587
